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Can	post-Corona	fiscal	discipline	be	sustained?	The
case	of	Norway	proves	top	civil	servants	can	make	it
happen
COVID-19	has	caused	extremally	high	levels	of	budgetary	deficits	and	government	borrowing,	which	in	the	future
will	require	more	stringent	fiscal	policies	write	Benny	Geys	and	Rune	J.	Sørensen	(BI	Norwegian	Business
School).	How	can	post-Corona	fiscal	discipline	be	sustained?	Budget	preparation	by	top	civil	servants	can	allow	for
better	balancing	of	the	books,	they	claim.
The	Coronavirus	pandemic	has	caused	an	unprecedented	economic	downturn	across	all	continents,	and	many
governments	in	response	have	launched	exceptional	economic	stimuli	and	fiscal	rescue	packages.	The	combined
total	of	such	packages	announced	by	G20	countries	has	been	estimated	to	exceed	€4.3	trillion	($4.7	trillion;	£3.8
trillion).	Together	with	the	dramatic	fall	in	tax	revenues	from	reduced	economic	activity,	this	is	set	to	push	the
average	debt-to-GDP	ratio	of	the	world’s	richest	countries	well	over	130%,	according	to	recent	calculations	by	the
OECD.	In	the	longer	term,	such	spectacular	levels	of	budgetary	deficits	and	government	borrowing	will	require
more	stringent	fiscal	policies.	We	argue	that	delegation	of	the	budget	preparation	process	to	top	civil	servants	could
facilitate	this	balancing	of	the	books.
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We	reach	this	conclusion	by	analysing	unusually	rich	data	about	the	budgetary	procedures	and	fiscal	performance
of	Norwegian	local	governments	over	a	25-year	period.	Municipalities	in	Norway	employ	one	of	three	budgetary
procedures,	whose	prevalence	over	time	is	depicted	in	the	diagram	below.	First,	there	is	the	traditional	‘bottom-up’
procedure	used	in	most	countries	around	the	world.	This	allows	government	agencies	and	standing	committees	to
articulate	their	preferred	spending	needs,	which	then	form	the	basis	for	political	debates	that	fix	the	overall	spending
level.	Second,	there	is	the	‘centralized’	political	procedure.	In	this	framework,	key	elected	politicians	fix	the	overall
spending	level	first,	and	program	allocations	are	decided	afterwards.	Finally,	an	‘administrative’	procedure	exists
where	responsibility	for	preparing	a	coherent	budget	proposal	is	assigned	to	a	high-ranked	administrative	official.
They	are	awarded	the	full	budgetary	initiative	and	presents	a	draft	budget	with	sectoral	spending	limits	to	the	local
council	committees,	which	can	make	additional	recommendations.
As	displayed	in	the	diagram,	local	governments	in	Norway	have	made	substantial	changes	in	their	budgetary
processes	over	time.	Bottom-up	processes	saw	a	continuous	decline	starting	from	a	very	high	level	in	the	1990s.
Centralized	political	control	became	more	popular	up	to	the	mid-1990s,	but	has	lost	much	ground	again	in	the
2000s.	Very	few	local	authorities	applied	the	administrative	process	at	the	start	of	the	period	under	analysis,	while
nearly	80%	currently	delegate	the	budgetary	initiative	to	a	top	official	in	the	local	administration.	This	substantial
variation	in	budgetary	procedures	across	time	and	space	is	ideal	to	assess	how	such	institutional	characteristics
affect	governments’	(lack	of)	fiscal	discipline.
Diagram:	Prevalence	of	budgetary	procedures	1991-2016
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Comparing	the	fiscal	situation	in	municipalities	before	and	after	they	introduce	administrative	delegation	in	their
budgetary	procedures,	we	discover	a	striking	improvement	in	their	fiscal	situation.	Compared	to	procedures	relying
on	political	coordination	or	the	traditional	‘bottom-up’	procedure,	deficits	are	approximately	0.3	percentage	points
lower	on	average	under	administrative	delegation.	This	is	a	very	significant	improvement	keeping	in	mind	long-term
budgetary	surplus	requirements	of	3	percentage	points	at	the	local	government	level	in	Norway	–	or	the	3%	deficit
rule	at	the	heart	of	the	EU’s	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	(SGP).	Further	analysis	indicates	that	the	majority	of	this
improvement	in	fiscal	performance	is	due	to	keeping	spending	under	control.	This	suggests	that	administrative
delegation	allows	the	implementation	of	a	stricter	cost-control	regime.
What	mechanisms	account	for	this	result?	First	of	all,	civil	servants	can	control	the	type	and	nature	of	information
reaching	elected	politicians	and	the	public.	They	can	thus	exploit	their	informational	advantage	to	achieve	better
fiscal	outcomes.	Furthermore,	delegation	might	weaken	the	many	(political)	voices	speaking	in	favour	of	increased
spending,	and	could	“anchor”	the	subsequent	political	debate.	This	benefits	stricter	control	over	budgetary
decisions.	A	final	key	element	is	that	the	administrator	in	charge	should	be	held	directly	accountable	for	fiscal
performance.	This	creates	strong	incentives	towards	sustainable	fiscal	policies	even	in	a	setting	where	the
administrator	might	not	have	the	last	word	in	the	budget	(as	is	the	case	in	Norway).
Importantly,	the	average	effect	of	administrative	delegation	hides	significant	heterogeneity	depending	on	the
majority/minority	position	of	the	mayor.	Administrative	delegation	improves	fiscal	performance	only	when	the	mayor
is	in	a	minority	position	(yielding	a	net	surplus	increase	of	about	0.5	percentage	points).	It	has	no	significant	effect	in
majority	situations.	The	results	thus	indicate	that	administrative	delegation	in	budgetary	processes	may	constitute	a
particularly	important	tool	to	alleviate	poor	fiscal	performance	under	‘weak’	minority	governments.
The	coming	years	and	decades	will	involve	a	painful	return	to	fiscal	stringency,	and	governments’	budgetary
institutions	should	be	designed	accordingly.	The	experiences	of	Norway-style	budgetary	delegation	offers	an
important	impetus	to	these	considerations,	and,	the	research	findings	ought	to	be	particularly	useful	for	weak
government	striving	to	meet	the	requirements	of	post-Corona	fiscal	sustainability.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog	or	LSE.	Source:	Benny	Geys	and
Rune	J.	Sørensen.	2020.	Administrative	Delegation	of	Budgetary	Powers	and	Fiscal	Performance.	Kyklos,
forthcoming.	Image	by	Holger	Adams,	CC	BY-SA	4.0.
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